Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Names, proper names, philosophy: the status of proper names is a relatively new philosophical problem. S. A. Kripke has treated it as one of the first in “Naming and Necessity” (three lectures at Princeton University 1970, reprint Cambridge, 1980). Against the traditional bundle theory, according to which the meaning of names lies in the properties, or at least in the essential properties of their bearers, Kripke develops a causal theory of the names, which ultimately goes back to a baptism in the broader sense. The decisive point is that the name is associated with the person but it is not required that the person has any additional properties. See also causal theory, possible worlds, rigidity, rigid designators, descriptions._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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Robert Brandom on Proper Names - Dictionary of Arguments
I 614 Proper names/Name/Brandom: can only be understood in terms of the sortal associated with them - e.g. you can not just point to an equestrian statue and call "it" a "lump". It depends on whether you are referring to the statue, or the lump of clay. >Reference. I 805f Name/Reference/Kripke: if it is determined that the name is used "as usual", different beliefs cannot endanger the reference - BrandomVsKripke: the concept of reference should not be assumed in order to be able to inherit an expression anaphorically - Co-typicity does not guarantee coreference! - (not even for canonically pronominal "he", "it") - in the anaphoric chain, the quote redemption principle is not applicable - BrandomVsKripke: no paradox, but we can use names in a way that is excluded by the disquotation scheme - e.g. "Cicero" (Spy): not all need to belong to the same chain, but you also do not need quasi-names (such as quasi indexical expressions (>Castaneda)). I 807 Name/Frege/Brandom: according to Frege names are supposedly linked with property. - KripkeVs - Brandom: this is not Fregian: according to Frege, properties are part of the meaning (reference), and not of the sense - they are not immediately comprehensible. Brandom: conceptual contents expressed by names are opaque. >Opacity. I 811 Definition Names/Brandom: anaphoric chains of co-typical tokenings. >Anaphora._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 |
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> Counter arguments against Brandom
> Counter arguments in relation to Proper Names
